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I. INTRODUCTION
Those concerned with the progress of human rights' have reason
to be discouraged and apprehensive today. Recent events raise doubts
about the status of human rights. Certainly by many standards, the
condition of mankind has improved since ancient times, but large scale
social control and technological advancements have increased our abil-
ity to inflict violence and oppression. The atrocities of the Second
World War and the recent genocide in Southeast Asia are memorable
low points in mankind's history and give good reason to question the
"progress" of modern man. The campaign for human rights, because
1. An explicit delineation of the many rights included in the term "human rights" is
not necessary or feasible for the purposes of this Note. Except where otherwise noted, the
term is used to include the many rights referred to in the various international declarations,
e.g., U.N. CHARTER, including references in the Preamble; art. 1, para. 3; art. 13, para. l(b);
art. 55; art. 56; art. 62, para. 2; art. 68; art. 76(c). See also Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter cited as UDHR]; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967);
(European) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; American Con-
vention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/SER. K/XVI/1.1 Doc. 65 (1970).
For a general discussion of the historical and modern meanings of "human rights" see
L. HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY (1978); V. VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGHTS, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD CoMMuNITY, 9-102 (1970); M. CRANSTON, WHAT ARE
HUMAN RIGHTS? (1962).
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of its concern with the condition of the individual and its implications
for world peace, deserves and requires the full commitment of social
resources. As is true in many areas of social development, the legal
profession is in a special position to effect change in human rights.
Human rights have undergone substantial change since the Second
World War, largely at the hands of international lawyers. A new con-
sciousness of the international community is reflected in two develop-
ments which have radically transformed international law: (1) a
proliferation of international treaties dealing with the protection of
human rights,2 and (2) the vesting of the individual with sufficient in-
ternational legal character to make him a subject of international law.3
Under international law during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the individual had no cognizable rights or duties; the individ-
ual was not considered a possible subject of international law.4 Now
the individual is the focus of many international human rights instru-
ments, some of which subject the individual to personal liability and
provide for personal remedies.5
However, in many respects this "transformation" has proved illu-
2. See, eg., treaties, conventions, and covenants listed supra note 1. For a list of all
human rights documents on deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations
through 1977 including signatures and ratifications, see I J. JoYcE, HUMAN RIGHTS; INTER-
NATIONAL DocUMENTs 518-23 (1978).
3. The vesting of individuals with international legal character is one of the most
profound developments in modern international law. Originally, the "law of nations" did
not distinguish between individuals and states, or public and private rights or duties. See
Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA.
L. REv. 26, 27 (1952). However, during the 19th century, a restrictive conception of interna-
tional law developed, which has been labelled the "classical system" of international law.
(Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Aurisdiction over International Human Rights Clains: The .4lien
Tort Claims Act after Filariga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. IN'L L. J. 53, 64 (1981)) or the
"conservative approach" to international law (Note, Towardan InternationalLaw ofHuman
Rights Based upon the Mutual Expectations of States, 21 VA. J. IN'TL L. 185, 190 (1980)).
This approach, based on the absolute sovereignty of states, held that the individual was
neither subject to, not directly protected by, international law. See Humphrey, The Interna-
tional Law of Human Rights in the Middle Twentieth Century, in THE PRESENT STATE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 75, 76 (M. Bas ed. 1973)..
The Second World War forced the world community to realize that human rights viola-
tions, aside from their inherent injustice, are a grave source of international instability.
Thus, human rights violations were brought out of the closet of solely "domestil jurisdic-
tion" and exposed to the light of international scrutiny. This shift in focus of international
law is no less than revolutionary. Id at 83. See also P. CoRBET, THE GROWTH OF WORLD
LAW (1971); Tucker, Has the Individual Become the Subject olnternational Law?, 34 U. CiN.
L. REv. 341 (1965); .Brownlie, he Place of the Individual in International Law, 50 VA. L.
Rnv. 435 (1964).
4. See Humphrey, supra note 3, at 76.
5. Id at83.
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sory. International law remains a simple social structure; it lacks the
centralized sanctioning authority and secondary rule of recognition
characteristic of the municipal law of more mature social systems.
6
Much of the "law" of the international community appears impotent
when evaluated on the basis of criteria normally applied to municipal
law. More and more we must confront "a partially fictitious legal uni-
verse saturated with treaties that are in force but are in fact ineffective.
International law [is] departing from reality, and, therefore, losing
credibility."7
While human rights are no longer solely within the domestic juris-
diction of sovereign states, a centralized sanctioning authority to en-
force their protection via international law is still lacking.' Almost the
only time that international human rights provisions are given the ef-
fect of municipal law is when states choose to implement them domes-
tically and apply domestic sanctions.
The United States has conspicuously failed to do this. The United
States was one of the leaders in the initial development of international
human rights law after the Second World War,9 but is party to rela-
tively few international human rights treaties, 10 and has generally re-
fused to implement those that it has joined." The result is a poor
United States record for developing human rights law. Despite the
Reagan administration's recent shift toward a "hands-ofi' policy to-
ward human rights development, there remains a presently effective
and potentially powerful means for accomplishing this end.'2
6. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 208-31 (1961). It is possible that interna-
tional law has begun to develop a basic secondary rule of recognition, providing general
criteria of validity for the rule of international law. Id at 231. See also Topco/Libya Arbi-
tration Case, 104 JOURNAL Du DRorr INTERNATIONAL 350 (1977); Schweber, Confrontation,
Consensus, and Codcation, Address to the American Branch of the International Law
Ass'n (Nov. 3, 1978).
7. Paolillo, Some General Reections on the Acceptance of Treaties as a Means of Ex-
panding the Body of International Law, 10 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 355, 368 (1974).
8. The European Court of Human Rights, to the extent that it serves as a central sanc-
tioning authority for states that are party to the European Human Rights Convention, is an
exception to this statement. See Hoffman, Implementation of International Instruments on
Human Rights, 1959 AM. SOc'Y OF INT'L L. PRoc. 235, 239-40.
9. See Rusk, A Personal Reection on International Covenants on Human Rt'hts, 9
HOFSTRA L. REV. 515 (1981).
10. The United States is a party to 13 international human rights instruments, 12 of
which are listed in Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 3, at 65. The 13th is the UDHR, supra
note 1.
11. The record of the United States regarding the implementation of human rights trea-
ties is largely a result of its legal position on the self-executing status of treaties. See sections
I, IV infra.
12. The United States is not a party to 12 international human rights instruments, listed
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International human fights law, both treaty and customary, can be
used as authority in United States courts to varying extents, and undei
some circumstances can be a source of domestically enforceable rights.
The latter application has been made in several significant recent
cases, 13 and more cases are presently working their way through the
United States court system. 4 Attorneys will want to be aware of this
developing area of the law, as the opportunity to make a profound im-
pact on the nature of international human rights law is now before us.
This Note will begin by exploring the ways in which international
human rights law may be recognized as authority in United States
courts. It will then focus upon the extent to which the United Nations
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have been
given legal force. Judicial recognition of the evolved character of inter-
national law in the case of Filartiga v. Pena Irala will be discussed.
Section I will consider the troublesome concept of self-executing
treaty analysis and evaluate the cases that have applied this analysis to
the U.N. Charter and the UDHR. The concluding section will reevalu-
ate the self-executing treaty analysis and advocate its revision in light
of the changed character of international law.
H. RECENT PROGRESS IN THE DOMESTIC
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW
The cases discussed in this section demonstrate a number of ways
in which international law may be recognized as authority in United
in Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 3, at 65. On the policies of the current administration, see
generally Cohen, Wrong on Human Rights, NEw REPtBLIC, March 28, 1981, at 13. The role
of human rights in the foreign policy of the current administration is revealed in this state-
ment by U.N. Ambassador Jean Fitzpatrick: "[tihe central goal of our foreign policy should
be not the moral elevation of other nations, but the preservation of a civilized conception of
our own national self interest." Interview, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, March 2, 1981, at
59-60.
13. See section II infra. -i
14. One of the most interesting cases is Crockett v. Reagan, No. 81-1034 (D.D.C., filed'
May 1, 1981), recently brought by Congressman George W. Crockett, Jr. and 23 other mem-
bers of Congress against President Reagan, Secretary of State Haig, and Secretary of De-
fense Weinberger. The case was assigned to Judge Joyce Green, who also wrote the
opinions in Leteler v. Chile (discussed at text accompanying notes 44-61) and Hanoch Tel-
Oren v. Libyan People's Republic (discussed at text accompanying notes 164-86 infra). Plain-
tiffs seek an order requiring the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from El Salvador, and the
ending of all military aid to the ruling junta there. Liability is alleged under article I, section
8, clause 11 of the U.S..Constitution, the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48
(1973), and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2304, as amended Pub. L. 96-53,
tit. V, § 511, 93 Stat. 380; Pub. L. 96-92 § 4, 93 Stat. 702 (1979).
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States courts. In general, there are two primary sources for this author-
ity: the common law and the United States Constitution.
Regarding the common law, it has been said that "[iut is an ancient
and a salutary feature of the Anglo-American legal tradition that the
Law of Nations is a part of the law of the land to be ascertained and
administered, like any other, in the appropriate case."' 5 This tenet of
our common law heritage is also reflected in article VI. paragraph two
of the United States Constitution:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
While these principles appear strong and unequivocal, their appli-
cation has been weak and ambiguous. As will be seen, the role of inter-
national law within the domestic legal framework is unclear.
Numerous tensions exist between the authority of domestic (or munici-
pal) law based on Anglo-American traditions and the authority of in-
ternational law based on broader, world-wide consensus. Changing
conceptions of the nature of international law have exacerbated these
tensions.
Due to the uncertainties in this area, systematic application of in-
ternational law within the domestic legal framework is lacking. Numer-
ous legal impediments have been developed that may be thrown in the
path of advocates invoking international law in domestic courts, e.g.
standing to sue and other abstention-oriented requirements. 16 Some
hurdles, such as the political question and sovereign immunity doc-
trines, take on a stricter character when applied to international law.17
Other hurdles are unique to international law, such as the Act of State
15. Dickinson, supra note 3, at 26. See also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900).
16. For a discussion of standing requirements applied in cases involving international
human rights law, see Note, Individual Enforcement of Obligations Alrising under the United
Nations Charter, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 195 (1979); Note, Federal Courts Lack Subject
Matter Jurisdiction to Adjudicate Claims 4rising Out of U.N. Security Council Resolutions, 24
KAN. L. Rav. 395, 397-98 (1976); Stavis, Standing to Sue: Diggs v. Secretary of Treasury and
Union Carbide Corporation, 30 GUILD PRACTITIONER 102 (1973).
17. For a discussion of the expanded role of the political question doctrine in interna-
tional law cases, see L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 210-16 (1972).
For a discussion of the sovereign immunity doctrine and its applications in our horizontal
legal order, see R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC CouRTs IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER 139 (1964).
[Vol 5
International Human Rights
doctrine and self-executing treaty analysis." This panoply of judicial
options, combined with a relatively small number of case applications,
results in divergent and often conflicting holdings.
A. International Human Rights Law as a Standard for Domestic
Constitutional Norms
It has often been said that the framers of the United States Consti-
tution showed tremendous foresight in leaving its terms broad and
vague.19 The indefinite terms of the Constitution represent far more
than the lowest common denominator at the Constitutional Conven-
tion; they reflect the conviction of the founders that the Constitution
should be a living document, able to grow and change with an evolving
society. Justice Frankfurter stated that fundamental constitutional con-
cepts such as due process and equal protection are not "final and fixed"
but evolve on the basis of judgments "reconciling the needs both of
continuity and of change in a progressive society."' 20 An important
question arises as to what sources and standards should be considered
in evaluating the evolving meaning of these concepts. The answer re-
mains open.
In the early days of the American Republic, when there were com-
paratively few domestic sources for national policy, courts readily uti-
lized views from abroad to interpret phrases and to define accepted
norms.21 It has been suggested that as domestic authority became more
abundant, courts tended to rely less on international sources. This
tendency was reinforced by a restrictive conception of international
law, sometimes termed the classical system of international law, which
took hold in the late nineteenth century and became predominant by
1900.23
Concepts of international law changed, and so did the readiness of
18. For a discussion of the Act of State doctrine, see Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power
of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 805 (1964); Henkin, Act of State To-
day: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1967); R. FALK, supra
note 17, at 64-138; discussion of Letelier v. Republic of Chile, at text accompanying notes
44-61 infra. Self-executing treaty analysis is discussed in sections III and IV of this Note,
infra.
19. See, eg., E.S. CORWiN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, ITS LEGAL AND His-
TORICAL BASIS, AND OTHER ESSAYS (1914).
20. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-72 (1952).
21. See, e.g., United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 841 (C.C.D. Mass.
1822). See also Wright, National Courts and Human Rights-The Fujii Case, 45 Am. LITr'L
L. 62, 81 (1951).
22. Wright, supra note 21, at 81.
23. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 3, at 64. See also discussion in note 3, supra.
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the judiciary to evaluate constitutional norms in light of international
standards. With the classical conception of international law on the
wane by the middle of this century, Justice Frankfurter was willing to
define due process on the basis of "standards of decency more or less
universally accepted."' 4 By the end of the Second World War, courts
were again looking to international standards in interpreting constitu-
tional norms, especially when evaluating those norms in light of na-
tional policy.25 One of the most prominent examples of judicial
cognizance of international human rights norms came in the case of
Oyama v. Calfornia. 26
The Oyama case dealt with the California Alien Land Law, a state
statute that clearly discriminated on the basis of race.2 7 In holding this
law contrary to the fourteenth amendment, four Justices of the
Supreme Court invoked the United Nations Charter in their concur-
ring opinions. Justices Black and Douglas reasoned:
[W]e have recently pledged ourselves to cooperate with the United
Nations to 'promote. . . universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedom for all without distinction as
to race, sex, language, or religion.' How can this nation be faithful to
this international pledge if state laws which bar land ownership and
occupancy by aliens on account of race are permitted to be
enforced?
28
24. Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 469 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
25. See, e.g., Namba v. McCourt, 185 Or. 579, 603, 204 P.2d 569, 579 (1949); Perez v,
Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
26. 332 U.S. 633 (1947).
27. 1 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 261 (1945). The pertinent portions read as follows:
§ 1. All aliens eligible to citizenship under the laws of the United States may ac-
quire, possess, enjoy, use, cultivate, occupy, transfer, transmit and inherit real
property, or any interest therein, in this state, and have in whole or in part the
beneficial use thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as citizens of the
United States, except as otherwise provided by the laws of this state.
§ 2. All aliens other than those mentioned in section one of this act may acquire,
possess, enjoy, use, cultivate, occupy and transfer real property, or any interest
therein, in this state, and have in whole or in part the beneficial use thereof, in the
manner and to the extent, and for the purposes prescribed by any treaty now ex-
isting between the government of the United States and the nation or country of
which such alien is a citizen or subject, and not otherwise. ...
§ 7. Al' real property hereafter acquired in fee in violation of the provisions of
this act by any alien mentioned in Section 2 of this act, ... shall escheat as of the
date of such acquiring, to, and become and remain the property of the state of
California....
28. 332 U.S. at 649-50.
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Justice Murphy, joined by Justice Rutledge, citing the same pledge,
stated:
The Alien Land Law stands as a barrier to the fulfillment of that
national pledge. Its consistency with the Charter, which has been
duly ratified and adopted by the United States, is but one more rea-
son why the statute must be condemned.
29
In two more recent cases, declarations of international human
rights standards were applied in purely domestic contexts, to define due
process. The first, Sterling v. Cupp,30 was brought by male inmates of
the Oregon State Penitentiary to enjoin prison officials from assigning
female correctional personnel to duties that involved frisks or patdowns
of male prisoners. In support of its holding that the challenged activity
violated state constitutional norms, the Oregon Supreme Court looked
to international human rights law as a standard of measure:
Indeed, the same principles have been a worldwide concern recog-
nized by the United Nations and other multinational bodies. The
various formulations in these different sources in themselves are not
constitutional law. We cite them here as contemporary expressions
of the same concern with minimizing needlessly harsh, degrading, or
dehumanizing treatment of prisoners that is expressed in article I,
section 13 [of the Oregon Constitution].3 '
The second case, Lareau v. Mfanson,32 was brought by inmates of a
Connecticut prison against prison officials. The inmates claimed that
conditions and procedures at the prison violated both the eighth
amendment duty to provide adequate housing for convicted inmates
and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court
held that the conditions under challenge violated the inmates' due pro-
cess rights,33 noting that prison conditions left many of the inmates
with approximately one-half as much space as is prescribed as mini-
mally acceptable by generally recognized correctional standards.3 4 In
an exhaustive footnote,3 5 the court set out some of the generally recog-
nized standards, including the United Nations Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.36 The U.N. standards had been
29. Id at 673.
30. 625 P.2d 123 (1981).
31. Id at 131.
32. 507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980).
33. Id at 1190.
34. Id at 1187.
35. Id at 1187 n.9.
36. Adopted Aug. 30, 1955, by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF./6/1, Annex I, A (1956);
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expressly adopted as the "Preamble to the Administrative Directives of
the Connecticut Department of Correction" by the defendant depart-
ment in 1974.37
The Lareau court, however, considered the Standard Minimum
Rules as having a significance far beyond the mere fact that the Con-
necticut administration had adopted them. The court noted that Jus-
tice Rehnquist had stated that such standards "may be instructive in
certain cases."" The court cited Filartiga v. Pena-Irala for the proposi-
tion that the standards:
may be significant as expressions of the obligations to the interna-
tional community of the member states of the United Nations...
and as part of the body of international law (including customary
international law) concerning human rights which has been built
upon the foundation of the United Nations Charter.
39
The court also observed the "well established [principle] that custom-
ary international law is part of the law -of the United States."' The
court recognized that the Standard Minimum Rules were adopted by
the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in accordance
with the Council's mandate under article 62(2) of the Charter,41 and
noted the leading role played by the United States in these
developments.42
In concluding its incisive footnote, the court observed that all of
these facts did not necessarily render the United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules applicable in the case before it. Nonetheless the court
stated:
[T]hese actions constitute an authoritative international statement of
basic norms of human dignity and of certain practices which are re-
pugnant to the conscience of mankind. The standards embodied in
this statement are relevant to the 'canons of decency and fairness
which express the notions of justice' embodied in the Due Process
adopted July 31, 1957, by the Economicand Social Council, E.S.C. Res. 663C (XX1V), 24
U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1) 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957).
37. 507 F. Supp. at 1187 n.9.
38. Id (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 544 n.27 (1979)).
39. 507 F. Supp. at 1188 n.9. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) is
discussed at text accompanying notes 99-129 infra.
40. 507 F. Supp. at 1188 n.9 (citing the Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), and
L. HENKIN, supra note 17, at 221).
41. The Economic and Social Council is authorized to "make recommendations for the
purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all." U.N. CHARTER art. 62(2).
42. 507 F. Supp. at 1188 n.9.
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Clause.4 3
B. Letelier v. Republic of Chile": Jurisdiction over Foreign States
for Tortious Violations of International Law
The Letelier case was brought by the survivors of Orlando Lete-
lier, a Chilean dissident leader45 assassinated in the United States in
1976, and by the survivors of an American, Ronni Moffitt, also killed in
the assassination. The Republic of Chile, an American resident of
Chile, and several members of an anti-Castro Cuban exile group were
named as defendants. The individuals allegedly acted at the direction
of the intelligence agency of the Chilean government. 46 The plaintiffs
alleged five causes of action arising out of the assassination, including
"tortious activities in violation of the law of nations resulting in death
to Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt." 47
The Letelier case was decided in two opinions, both written by
Judge Joyce Hens Green of the District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia.48 The Chilean government refused to enter a formal appear-
ance through counsel, but communicated, by diplomatic notes relayed
through the State Department, its view that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction.49 A default judgment was entered against the Chil-
ean government. The only legal issues discussed in any detail in the
opinions relate to the jurisdictional question.5"
Jurisdiction was granted "pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1331,
43. Id (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952)).
44. 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980), 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980).
45. The target of the assassination, Orlando Letelier, had been a prominent figure in the
Chilean government during the Allende administration, serving as Ambassador to the
United States, Minister of Foreign Relations, Minister of Interior, and finally as Minister of
Defense. When the Pinochet regime came to power in September of 1973, Letelier was first
imprisoned and eventually expelled from Chile. Upon immigrating to the United States,
Letelier served as Director of the Transnational Program at the Institute for Policy Studies
in Washington, D.C., and taught at a local university. He was a prominent critic of the
Chilean military junta headed by President Pinochet. 502 F. Supp. at 264-65.
46. Originally, the intelligence organ (Centro Nacional de Informaciones) and several
additional individuals were named as defendants. For various reasons, and with plaintiffs'
acquiescence, these defendants were dismissed without prejudice. 502 F. Supp. at 261 n.2.
47. Id at 260 n.l.
48. The first opinion held that the court properly had jurisdiction over the case. 488 F.
Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980). The second opinion held that judgment by default and damages
were appropriate. 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980).
49. 488 F. Supp. at 667-68.
50. For a plaintiff to be able to secure a default judgment under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, he must establish his claim by evidence satisfactory to the court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1608(e) (1976).
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1332(a)(3), 1343(l)-(2), 1350 and the doctrines of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction."' 51 Judge Green construed defendant's diplomatic notes to
the court as a "suggestion" that the court lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion.5 2 The judge addressed the jurisdictional issues, including the de-
fenses of sovereign immunity and Act of State.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was passed by Congress in
1976 in an effort to introduce uniformity to sovereign immunity deter-
minations by transferring responsibility for such decisions from the ex-
ecutive branch to the judiciary, thereby reducing the foreign policy
implications of the decisions. The Act specifies categories of actions for
which foreign states are not entitled to claim sovereign immunity from
the jurisdiction of American courts. 3
One such category covers cases "in which money damages are
sought. . . for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of prop-
erty, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or
omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that
foreign state. . . ."' Chile maintained that this category was not
meant to include political, tortious acts of a government, but merely
those formerly classified a,, private or commercial ('ure gestionis).55
Judge Green rejected this a:gument, stating that the plain meaning of
the statute included such tortious acts as political assassination, and
that nothing in the legislative history contradicts or qualifies the plain
56meaning.
Chile also claimed that the Act of State doctrine excused it from
the court's jurisdiction. The classic formulation of the Act of State doc-
trine was stated by the Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign pow-
51. 502 F. Supp. at 266.
52. 488 F. Supp. at 667.
53. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1605, 1607 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7
(1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6604; S. REP. No. 94-1310, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1976).
55. The classification of acts of a state as public (lure imperfl) or private (lure geslionis)
was a determinative characteristic in sovereign immunity cases prior to the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act, and was clearly articulated in a letter by Jack Tate, Legal Advisor to
the State Department. See 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
56. 488 F. Supp. at 671-72.
[Vol 5
International Human Rights
ers as between themselves.57
Chile argued that the acts allegedly taken to assassinate Letelier
were carried out within Chile's borders and therefore were entitled toimmunity under the Act of State doctrine.5" Judge Green rejected this
argument for two reasons. First, the alleged actions of Chile's agents
resulted in tortious injury within this country. Second, to allow the Act
of State doctrine to be used in this fashion "would totally emasculate
the purpose and effectiveness of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act" by allowing a state to reimpose the pre-Act framework of sover-
eign immunity under the guise of the Act of State doctrine.5 9
Having established jurisidictional grounds, Judge Green in her
second opinion turned to the question of whether a judgment by- de-
fault for the five causes of action was in order. Judge Green found that
plaintiffs had produced satisfactory evidence to establish two of the
causes of action against the Republic of Chile, but not as to the cause of
action based on violation of international law.60 Conversely, all five
causes of action were affirmed as against the individually named de-
fendants." Judge Green awarded substantial damages for pain and
suffering and wrongful death against all defendants, $2,000,000 in pu-
nitive damages against the individually named defendants, and
awarded both expenses and substantial attorneys fees to the plaintiffs.
C. Alien Children Education Cases: Federal Preemption of
Fundamental Human Rights Standards?
The State of Texas enacted a statute denying public education to
children who are neither United States citizens nor legally admitted
aliens.62 When various independent school districts in Texas began en-
forcing the law in the middle and late seventies, a number of suits were
filed to challenge the statute. Two of these cases, Doe v. Ply/er and In
re Alien Children Education Litigation, were brought in federal district
courts in Texas and have been consolidated for review by the United
States Supreme Court. 3 These two suits challenged the statute on five
57. 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
58. 488 F. Supp. at 266.
59. Id
60. 502 F. Supp. at 266.
61. Id
62. Tax. EDUC. CODE (Vernon Supp. 1976) § 21.031.
63. Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), aft'g 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Texas
1978); In re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Texas 1980),prob.fjirs noted, - U.S. -. 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981).
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different grounds, including some especially imaginative theories:
(1) that the statute violated domestic constitutional guarantees of
equal protection,
64
(2) that the statute was in conflict with self-executing provisions of
the U.N. Charter and the Charter of the Organization-ofAmeri-
can States,
65
(3) that it was in violation of customary international law,66
(4) that it was contrary to federal policies, both foreign and domes-
tic, that deal with the human rights of aliens and is therefore
preempted under the supremacy clause,
67
(5) that the statute was an impermissible interference with the fed-
eral government's foreign affairs powers.
68
Both district courts held the law to be invalid on the basis of equal
protection.69 While one district court also held that the state law was
invalid under the preemption doctrine,7 ° this theory and all of the other
alternative grounds were rejected by the other district court.7 '
The preemption doctrine, based on article VI of the United States
Constitution, holds that any state legislation which improperly en-
croaches upon an area of federal responsibility or concern will be held
invalid.72 The doctrine has been applied to invalidate both state regu-
lation of matters subject to exclusive federal power, such as foreign re-
lations,73 and state regulation that conflicts with the effectuation of
congressional objectives.74
In the alien education cases, the Texas statute was alleged to con-
flict with federal policy in the areas of immigration and foreign af-
fairs.75 Both immigration and foreign affairs are said to be areas of
exclusive federal power;76 therefore, states should be precluded from
regulating those fields. However, because the leading precedents effec-
64. 458 F. Supp. at 578-80; 501 F. Supp. at 583-84.
65. 501 F. Supp. at 589-90. See also general discussion in section III of this Note, infra.
66. 501 F. Supp. at 595-96.
67. 458 F. Supp. at 590-92; 501 F. Supp. at 584-88.
68. 501 F. Supp. at 590-95.
69. 458 F. Supp. at 593; 501 F. Supp. at 583-84.
70. 458 F. Supp. at 590-92.
71. 501 F. Supp. at 589-96.
72. See 501 F. Supp. at 584.
73. See Comment, 16 Hous. L. REv. 667, 693 (1979), citedin 501 F. Supp. at 584, n.107.
74. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
75. 458 F. Supp. at 590-92; 501 F. Supp. at 584-95.
76. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (immigration is area of exclusive federal
power). Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (foreign policy is area of exclusive federal
power).
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tively allow for considerable state activity in each of these "exclusive-
federal fields, 7 7 the preemption argument in the alien education cases
was also based upon the premise that the statute conflicted with the
aims of federal policies in these areas.
The district court in Doe v. Pvlyer agreed with the preemption ar-
gument.78 The court reviewed various federal laws regarding immigra-
tion and educational opportunity and noted that "federal laws
consistently demonstrate a strong congressional commitment to educa-
tion, in particular the education of disadvantaged children." 79 The
court quoted the Charter of the Organization of American States
(OAS), which provides that member states "wini exert the greatest ef-
forts," in accordance with their constitutional powers, to extend educa-
tional opportunity to all.80 The court concluded:
While none of these federal laws or policies precisely and expressly
prohibits the state conduct complained of in this case, that is not dis-
positive of the preemption challenge, '[f]or when the. question is
whether a federal act overrides a state law, the entire scheme of the
statute must.., be considered, and that which needs must be im-
plied is of no less force than that which is expressed.' Savage v.
Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912). The Texas statute challenged here
defeats the clear implications of federal laws covering both illegal
aliens and education of disadvantaged children."
The other Texas district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals disagreed with the preemption argument. The district court, in In
re Alien Children Education Litigation, looked solely to title I of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 in assessing federal
policy regarding educational opportunity. While recognizing that title
I represents a strong congressional commitment to educational oppor-
tunity, especially for low income and migratory agricultural workers'
children,82 and that the Act makes no distinction between documented
and undocumented workers 3 and is specifically designed to benefit
substantial numbers of undocumented children, 4 the court nonetheless
77. 424 U.S. at 355 (not every state enactment dealing with aliens is a regulation of
immigration, and state regulations harmonious with federal aims are allowable); New York
Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 423 n.29 (1973).
78. 458 F. Supp. at 590-92.
79. Id at 591.
80. Id at 592 (citing 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847, 721 U.N.T.S. 324 (1970)).
81. 458 F. Supp. at 592.
82. 501 F. Supp. at 584-88.
83. Id at 585.
84. Id at 586.
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concluded that the Texas statute denying education to undocumented
children does not stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and exe-
cution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress ... .
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that "the perceived
conflicts are at most illusory and that [the Texas statute] does not con-
flict with federal policy."8 6  The court- conceded, however, that
"[p]laintiffs' position is plausible, though not persuasive. Indeed, Con-
gress may have intended to ensure a free education to all children
within the United States. But we find no evidence that this was the
express or implied intent of Congress. ... "'
The district court in In re Alien Children Education Litigation also
rejected the claim based on impermissible state interference with the
foreign affairs power. In considering this theory, the court first ob-
served the "waning of the nation-state" in the twentieth century and
the concomitant "internationalization of human rights."88 The court
noted numerous provisions of the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, the OAS Charter, and other international
human rights instruments which establish the right to free education.8 9
While the court stated that these provisions are not necessarily self-
executing, they nonetheless constitute federal foreign policy commit-
ments technically capable of ousting inconsistent state law.90 The court
stated that the question of whether such federal activity overrides in-
consistent state laws should be resolved "by construing the intent of
those who signed or ratified [the instruments]." 91
The district court concluded that the United States officials who
participated in the negotiation of these instruments did not intend to
oust inconsistent state laws,92 and that the prescriptive and normative
content of the provisions is of no preemptive force.93 As a result, state
interference with the obligation to promote the right to free education
was held not to constitute interference with foreign policy. 4
85. Id
86. 628 F.2d at 453.
87. Id at 454 (citing Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)).
88. 501 F. Supp. at 590 (citing Murphy, Children of the Eighth Day: The Role ofInterna-
tional Lawyers in a Post-Modern World, 13 INT'L LAw. 681, 684-85 (1979)).
89. 501 F. Supp. at 591-94.
90. Id at 591.
91. Id No authority is cited to support this method of analysis; the court's analysis
appears to be novel.
92. Id at 592-94.
93. Id at 591.
94. Id at 593.
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Many of the assumptions underlying the court's conclusions in
Alien Children Education are unclear. The court's assertion that state
interference with international obligations is permissible seems to rely
on dicta by Justice Stewart that "shifting winds at the State Depart-
ment cannot control whether a particular state statute is in conflict with
the United States conduct of foreign relations."95 Such reasoning is
particularly inappropriate when applied to the three international obli-
gations that the court considered: the U.N. Charter, the UDHR, and
the OAS Charter. These commitments cannot be characterized as
"shifting winds."
The district court's holding that the intent of the federal actors
who contracted our international obligations should determine whether
those obligations override conflicting state action is more troubling.
This approach apparently equates self-executing treaty analysis with
the doctrine of exclusive federal authority over the conduct of foreign
relations. Self-executing treaty analysis attempts to determine when
private litigants may claim enforceable rights under a treaty.96 The
doctrine of exclusive federal authority over the conduct of foreign rela-
tions is both constitutionally mandated and essential to the orderly con-
duct of our nation's international relations.97
The court's holding means that the federal government may only
preclude state interference with the conduct of foreign relations by
making self-executing treaties.98 Certainly such a holding greatly un-
dermines the conduct of diplomacy and has substantial constitutional
implications.
D. Filariga v. Pena-rala: An Evolution in International Law
1. Filariga v. Pena-frala99
The Filartiga case may prove to be the most significant domestic
case dealing with international law in this century. Discussion of this
case will be limited here to the court's analysis of what constitutes in-
95. Id at 591 (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 443 (1968) (Stewart, J.
concurring)).
96. See sections HlI-IV of this Note, infra.
97. See 501 F. Supp. at 595.
98. The court in .4lien Children Education stated:
[The federal government's exclusive authority over foreign relations] in the ab-
sence of the exercise of the power to make treaties having the effect of domestic
law, has not evolved to prohibit the states from enacting laws which may affect an
area of international concern.
501 F. Supp. at 595.
99. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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ternational law, and to a discussion of how to conceptualize a cause of
action under the Alien Tort Statute.10°
Filartiga is an unusual lawsuit. It is a private tort action brought
by aliens against foreign government officials for acts of torture perpe-
trated in the foreign country. The plaintiffs were Dr. Joel and Dolly
Filartiga, the father and sister of a seventeen-year-old boy allegedly
tortured to death by defendant Pena-Irala in Paraguay in 1976. Both
plaintiffs and defendants were citizens of the Republic of Paraguay,
although Ms. Filartiga had applied for permanent political asylum in
the United States. Defendant Pena-Irala, Inspector General of Police
in Asunci6n, Paraguay at the time of the murder, allegedly killed the
young Filartiga in retaliation for his father's political opposition to the
government. Dr. Filartiga subsequently brought an unsuccessful crimi-
nal action against Pena-Irala in the Paraguayan courts.' 0 '
In 1979, it was learned that Pena-Irala had entered the United
States. Dolly Filartiga, by then living in the United States, filed suit
with her father in the Eastern District of New York. The wrongful
death cause of action was stated as arising under:
wrongful death statutes; the U.N. Charter; the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights; the U.N. Declaration against Torture; the Ameri-
can Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and other perti-
nent declarations, documents and practices constituting the
customary international law of human rights and the law of nations
as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1350, Article II, sec. 2 and the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution.' 0 2
Jurisdiction was claimed under the general federal question provision
(28 U.S.C. § 1331), °3 and under the Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C.
§ 1350).104
The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
In doing so, the court relied on dicta in two recent Second Circuit opin-
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976).
101. 630 F.2d at 878. The primary result of the criminal case was that Dr. Filartiga's
attorney was arrested, shackled to a wall in police headquarters, and threatened with death
by Pena-Irala. Dr. Filartiga claimed that his attorney was subsequently disbarred without
cause and that after four years the criminal trial had not progressed. Id
102. Id at 879.
103. Because the court found jurisdiction under § 1350 (see discussion at notes 111-29
infra), it did not address the question of jurisdiction under § 1331, though it stated that it
"might also sustain jurisdiction" under that provision. Id at 887 n.22. See also discussion
of this issue in conjunction with the Hanoch Tel-Oren case at notes 164-86 infra.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 states: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for tort only committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States."
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ions that narrowly construed "the law of nations" as used in section
1350, to exclude that law which governs a state's treatment of its own
citizens."' t Thus, when the case came before the Second Circuit, only
the jurisdictional question was presented.
In deciding the jurisdictionaf question, the central issue before the
Second Circuit was whether the alleged conduct violated the "law of
nations."1 "6 The court first evaluated the acceptable sources of interna-
tional law. At the same time it discussed what level of international
assent is required for these sources to be considered international law.'
Finally, the court evaluated various sources to determine if the prohibi-
tion against torture met those requirements.
In considering the acceptable sources of international law, the
Fl/artiga court looked to the three classic sources enumerated by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Smith :107 the work of jurists, the
general usage and practice of nations, and judicial decisions recogniz-
ing and enforcing international law.10 8 The court pointed out that the
holding in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino10 9 requires a -high
standard of mutual assent between civilized nations before a rule may
be said to be part of the law of nations. 10
Because section 1350 requires a violation of the law of nations, a
more searching preliminary review of the merits is necessary than
would be the case under the more flexible "arising under" formulation
of section 1331. Noting with approval the standard used by Judge
Friendly in II v. Vencap, Ltd,II the court stated:
It is only where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the
wrong is of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of
express international accords, that a wrong generally recognized be-
comes an international law violation within the meaning of the
statute. 112
It is important to recognize the demanding standards the Second Cir-
cuit applied here. By requiring "express international accords" as a
necessary source of the norm asserted, the court went well beyond Sab-
105. 630 F.2d at 880 (citing Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976) and IIT v.
Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975)).
106. The court equates the terms "international law" and "the law of nations" in the first
sentence of the opinion. 630 F.2d at 877.
107. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
108. Id at 160-61.
109. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
110. 630 F.2d at 881.,
111. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
112. 630 F.2d at 888 (emphasis added).
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batino, which specified a stringent standard of mutual assent but not
express agreements.
The court maintained throughout the opinion that the interna-
tional law against torture is extremely clear and well accepted, noting
that "there are few, if any, issues in international law today on which
opinion seems to be so united as the limitations on a state's power to
torture persons held in its custody." 1 3 Nonetheless, the court made a
searching analysis of numerous specific sources of the norm.
In evaluating articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter, the court
stated that the Charter "makes it clear that in this modem age a state's
treatment of its own citizens is a matter of international concern."
114
However, the court noted that it previously held the Charter's mandate
not to be "wholly- self-executing."' 1 5 United States v. Toscanino,1
1 6
however, established the Charter as evidence of binding principles of
international law for United States courts. 117 Thus, the court con-
cluded that although there is no universal agreement as to the precise
extent of the "human rights and fundamental freedoms" guaranteed by
the Charter, there is unanimous agreement that "the guaranties in-
clude, at a bare minimum, the right to be free from torture."'1 8
The court began its analysis of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights by stating that the prohibition against torture "has be-
come part of customary international law, as evidenced and defined by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."'" 9 The court noted that
the UDHR was adopted without dissent by the U.N. General Assem-
bly, and that eighteen nations have incorporated it into their own con-
stitutions. 2 0 It also observed that the U.N. General Assembly declared
the Charter precepts as embodied in the UDHR to "constitute basic
principles of international law."1'' The court gave implicit endorse-
ment to the view that the UDHR "has become, in toto, a part of bind-
ing, customary international law."' 22
113. Id at 881 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964)).
114. 630 F.2d at 881.
115. Id (citing Hitai v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 343 F.2d 466 (2d Cir.
1965)).
116. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), discussed at notes 236-37, Zvfza.
117. 630 F.2d at 882 n.9.
118. Id at 882.
119. Id
120. Id at 883 n.10.
121. Id at 882 (citing G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970)).
122. Id at 883 (citing Nayor, Human Rights: The United Nations and United Slates For-
eign Policy, 19 -ARv. iNt'L L. 813, 816-17 (1978) and Waldlock, Human Rj'ghts in Contem-
porary International Law and the Signftance of the European Convention, INT'L & COMP.
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The court also considered General Assembly Resolutions such as
the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected
to Torture.12 The court noted the added significance of General As-
sembly Resolutions "because they specify with great precision the obli-
gations of member nations under the Charter."
124
Turning to another of the Smith criteria, the court considered the
modem usage and practice of nations. By looking to such international
treaties and accords as the American Convention on Human Rights,
125
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,1 26 and the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms,1 27 the court found universal renunciation of tor-
ture. 12  This finding was also supported in the constitutions of over
fifty-five nations, and various U.S. State Department studies.
1 29
In the course of its lengthy analysis of the present state of the inter-
national human rights law regarding torture, the court recognized two
extremely significant evolutionary developments in the nature of inter-
national law. First, international human rights law, particularly re-
garding torture, is no longer merely a part of "natural law," but has
finally taken its rightful place among the positive law of human society.
This new status for the international law against torture is a necessary
concomitant of the standard and source requirements that the court set
for section 1350 jurisdiction. The law had to be found in "express inter-
national accords," that is in positive law, or jurisdiction could not have
been obtained.
The second change in international law recognized in the Fl/artiga
decision is that international law now governs individuals as well as
states, and that states are therefore prohibited from violating the inter-
national legal rights of their own citizens. This development is re-
flected in the Second Circuit's overruling of its earlier dicta in Dreyfus
v. Von Finck and IIT v. Vencap, Ltd 3  As the Fllartiga court stated,
"[to hold that] violations of international law do not occur when the
L.Q., Supp. lubl. No. 11, at 15 (1965)). With the addition of the word "binding," this final
comment is virtually identical to the unattributed statement with which the court began its
discussion of the UDHR.
123. G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975).
124. 630 F.2d at 883.
125. Supra note 1.
126. Id
127. Id
128. 630 F.2d at 883-84.
129. Id at 884.
130. See text accompanying note 105 supra.
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aggrieved parties are nationals of the acting state, is clearly out of tune
with the current usage and practice of international law."'' It is no
longer solely up to the discretion of individual states to define what is a
matter of domestic jurisdiction, because "the nations have made it their
business, both through international accords and unilateral action, to
be concerned with domestic human rights violations of this
magnitude."' 32
International law has gone through considerable change since the
founding of this country. Our common law heritage required domestic
courts to apply international law when appropriate, and it was readily
used by United States courts during the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries to protect individuals victimized by violations of rec-
ognized international law.'33
By the middle of the nineteenth century, a more restrictive theory
of international law came into vogue. 134 This view was based on a con-
cept of a global community populated by isolated nation-states who
maintained exclusive discretion over matters within their bounda-
ries. 135 Under this view, non-state actors were excluded from the inter-
national legal framework, and individuals were considered to have no
international legal capacity. 136 Individuals were forced to rely on do-
mestic law to remedy violations of international law. When the state
was doing the violating, as was often the case with torture, this view
became unrealistic. 37
The barbarism of the Second World War struck the conscience of
the world. Numerous international instruments protecting human
rights came into existence, endorsed by many states. 38  Thus, the
evolution discerned by the Fiartia court represents a return to the
concept of international law that was prominent early in this country's
history. 1
3
131. 630 F.2d at 884.
132. Id at 889.
-133. Note, Federal Jurisdiction and the Protection of International Human Rights, 9
N.Y.U. Rav. L. & Soc. CHANGE 199, 215 (1980). One of the most common applications of
international law for and against individuals was under the doctrine of host&s humanis
generis, under which numerous domestic courts found pirates and slave traders liable for
violations of international law. See, e.g. U.S. v. Pirates, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820).
134. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 3, at 64.
135. Id at 65.
136. Note, supra note 133, at 199.
137. Id
138. See, e.g., note I sura.
139. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 3, at 56, 60-62; Note, supra note 133, at 21'3.
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2. In the Wake of Filartiga: Fernandez v. Wilkinson
A more recent case involving domestic application of international
human rights law is Fernandez v. Wilkinson.140 This case also provides
a useful overview of the sources and standards employed in discerning
international law and the authority that such international law carries
in United States courts.
As in Filartiga, the plaintiff in Fernandez had an unusual relation-
ship to the forum, in that he was one of approximately 130,000 Cuban
nationals who immigrated to the United States in June of 1980. How-
ever, because Mr. Fernandez admitted conviction of a crime involving
"moral turpitude" while in Cuba, 14 1 he was held to be an excludable
alien within the meaning of United States immigration law. 42 As a
result, he was ordered deported. The Immigration and Naturalization
Service and the Department of State were unable to return him to
Cuba because Cuba did not wish to take him back. As a result, Mr.
Fernandez was confined for an indefinite period in a maximum secur-
ity prison, without bail, and without having been charged with or con-
victed of a crime in this country.
Mr. Fernandez claimed that his treatment violated the eighth
amendment's protections against cruel and unusual punishment, and
the fifth amendment's due process clause. After lengthy analysis, the
district court concluded that the indeterminate maximum security de-
tention pending unforseeable deportation constituted arbitrary
detention. 143
However, because Mr. Fernandez was an excludable alien, he was
subject to a time-honored legal fiction that does not recognize him as
having entered United States borders. Consequently, he was not pro-
tected by any of the rights normally guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.'" This precedent was so well established that the court
felt compelled to follow it.145 Since domestic law was unavailable to
140. 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), a f'dsub non Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson,
654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
141. Mr. Fernandez's crimes were two thefts of suitcases, and attempted burglary. He
claimed that his crimes in part had been dictated by the economic exigencies in Cuba, and
that he had been convicted in military tribunals. He requested political asylum in the
United States, but it was denied. 505 F. Supp. at 789.
142. 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9), (20) (1976).
143. 505 F. Supp. at 791.
144. Id at 790 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67 (1976), and Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977)).
145. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the potency of the fiction diminishes
over time. Such an argument finds support in dictum in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
No. 11
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
Mr. Fernandez, the court turned to international law.
The Fernandez court cited The Nereide,146 The Paquete Habana,147
and Filartiga for the proposition that international law is a part of the
law of the United States which federal courts are bound to ascertain
and administer in an appropriate case.'14  Again citing Filartiga, the
court stated that "principles of customary international law may be dis-
cerned from an overview of express international conventions, the
teachings of legal scholars, the general custom and practice of nations,
and relevant judicial opinions."' 149 The court then stated that interna-
tional law so derived generally becomes binding on states in one of two
ways: either by express consent, as in ratifying a treaty, or by estab-
lished custom evidenced through wide practice. 50
The court next considered various sources of international law and
began by looking at numerous international agreements dealing with
human rights. As was true in Filartiga, these documents were consid-
ered, not for their independent legal significance, but as evidence of
established international custom and practice. The court considered
the U.N. Charter, the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, the Eu-
ropean Convention for the Protection. of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, and the decisions of international tribunals, 5' as
well as the views expressed by other branches of the federal govern-
ment.152 This Note will focus on the court's treatment of the U.N.
Charter and the UDHR.
The court described the U.N. Charter as "one important document
by which the U.S. is bound."' 53 However, the court offered no discus-
sion of how or to what extent the Charter is binding, nor any elabora-
763, 770 (1950), in which the court stated that an alien is "accorded a generous and ascend-
ing scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society." The district court in Fernan-
dez was unwilling to "initiate the corrosion of this venerable legal doctrine" by adopting
such dictum. 505 F. Supp. at 790.
146. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422 (1815).
147. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
148. 505 F. Supp. at 798.
149. Id
150. Id at 795.
151. Id at 796-97. See also note 1 supra.
152. Id at 797-98. It should be noted that several United States statutes, approved by
both the legislative and executive branches, limit aid to governments exhibiting a consistent
pattern of violations of internationally recognized human rights. See Weissbrodt, United
States Ratjfcation of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 MINN. L. REv. 35, 45 n.72 (1978);
Kaufman,.4 Legal Remedyfor International Torture? N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1980, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 49. See also discussion of Crockett v. Reagan, jupra note 14.
153. 505 F. Supp. at 796.
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tion of what this binding quality of the Charter means in terms of
United States obligations generally or the rights of Mr. Fernandez spe-
cifically. Because neither Mr. Fernandez, nor the amici in the case as-
serted any direct violation of Charter obligations, the Charter was
discussed in the case as "the symbol of human rights on an interna-
tional scale." '154
The UDHR was introduced as the most important of a great
number of international declarations, resolutions, and recommenda-
tions that are "not technically binding."' 5 The court quoted Eleanor
Roosevelt for the proposition that the UDHR was not originally in-
tended to be legally binding. 156 However, the court also quoted Rich-
ard Bilder, who stated: "although initially only declaratory and non-
binding, [the standards set by the UDHR] have by now, through wide
acceptance and recitation by nations as having a normative effect, be-
come binding customary law."'
157
The court further quoted the separate opinion of Vice President
Ammoun of the International Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion
on the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia for the proposi-
tion that the UDHR may be binding as declaratory of custom within
the meaning of-article 38(l)(b) of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice. 15
8
The court concluded that while the Declaration was not techni-
cally binding, it had come to carry considerably more weight than a
mere statement of basic principles: "it appears that the Declaration has
evolved into an important source of international human rights law." 159
Relying on the UDHR (and other sources as well) the court held that
arbitrary detention is prohibited by customary international law. 160
The Tenth Circuit affirmed this holding but declined to base its
opinion solely on international law. Instead, the court disposed of the
appeal by construing the applicable domestic statutes to require Fer-
nandez' release. 161 In doing so, the court effectively overruled a long
line of cases that had denied excludable aliens the rights afforded by
154. Id (citing Stotzky, Book Review, 11 MIAMI J. INTL L. 229, 237 (1979)).
155. 505 F. Supp. at 796.
156. Id
157. Id (quoting Bilder, The Status of International Human Rights Law.- An Overview,
1978 INT'L L. & PRAc. 1, 8).
158. 505 F. Supp. at 796.
159. Id at 796-97.
160. Id at 798.
161. 654 F.2d 1382, 1386-87 (10th Cir. 1981), sub nom, Rodriguez-Femandez v.
Wilkinson.
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the statutes. 162 To support its holding, the appellate court referred to
international law to help define due process, stating:
It seems proper ... to consider international law principles for no-
tions of fairness as to [the] propriety of holding aliens in detention.
No principle of international law is more fundamental than the con-
cept that human beings should be free from arbitrary
imprisonment. 1
63
3. Conceptualizing a Cause of Action Under International
Human Rights Law: Hanoch Tel-Oren
A fundamental question went virtually undiscussed by the Filar-
tiga court; specifically, how should a plaintiff properly conceptualize a
cause of action under section 1350? This question was confronted in
the recent case of Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab epublic. 64 The
case arose out of the terrorist attack of a tourist bus in Israel in March,
1978, in which twenty-nine people were killed.1 65 The plaintiffs in Ha-
noch Tel-Oren included the personal representatives of the murdered,
as well as injured survivors. Defendants were the Libyan Arab Repub-
lic, the Palestine Liberation Organization, The Palestine Information
Office, the National Association of Arab Americans, and the Palestine
Congress of North America.
Plaintiffs brought suit in the Federal District Court for the District
of Columbia and jurisdiction was alleged under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1441(d), 1602-11),
diversity of citizenship (28 U.S.C. § 1332), federal question (28 U.S.C.
§ 1331), and the Alien Tort Claims Statute (28 U.S.C. § 1350).166
Judge Green granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.6 7
Significantly, the opinion recognizes that because international
law is part of th& federal common law, an allegation of a violation of
the law of nations makes "federal" law sufficiently central to the dis-
pute for the purposes of section 1331 ("federal question") jurisdic-
tion.1 68 The opinion goes a step further, however, when in dictum it
162. See text accompanying notes 144-145 supra.
163. 654 F.2d at 1388. The court cited various other international documents, including
the UDHR and the American Convention on Human Rights. Id
164. 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981) (Green, J.).
165. 517 F. Supp. at 544.
166. Id at 545.
167. Id at 551.
168. Id at 548.
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states that "the jurisdictional bases of section 1331 and section 1350 are
identical as to the role of the law of nations."
1 69
Judge Green concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish jurisdic-
tion under either section 1331 or section 1350. The judge distinguished
between the jurisdictional issue and the issue of liability and interna-'
tional law:
The question whether the conduct complained of here violated the
law of nations, a question the court does not reach, is fundamentally
different, however, from the question whether treaties or even inter-
national law generally provide the plaintiffs with a cause of action. 170
In.failing to find any cause of action provided either by treaties or
customary international law, Judge Green placed heavy emphasis on
policy implications. The judge noted that allowing jurisdiction under
section 1331 for claims under the law of nations, absent a private right
of action, "sanctions judicial interference with foreign affairs and inter-
national relations, traditionally an area where courts have chosen to
stay their hands absent some fundamental constitutional violation."
171
Similarly, the judge refused jurisdiction under section 1350,172 absent a
private right of action, stating that:
Otherwise, federal courts would clutch power over cases, under the
guise of the law of nations, undoubtedly casting effect on interna-
tional relations and foreign policy when no country, friend or foe,
has consented to an American court opening its dooi to one alleging
violations of international legal principles. 73
The potential breadth of Judge Green's opinion in Hanoch Tel-
Oren is enormous. Conspicuously absent from the opinion is any dis-
cussion of the Fiartiga case, which is odd because the opinion cites
Filariga at the outset of its consideration of section 1350 jurisdic-
tion.174 The Filartiga opinion did not address the jurisdictional ques-
tion specifically in terms of whether the law of nations allowed a
private right of action for torture, yet such a finding is implicit in Filar-
169. Id at 549 n.2.
170. Id at 546.
171. Id at 548.
172. It is significant that Judge Green considered the absence of a private cause of action
to be a failure of a jurisdictional prerequisite, not merely grounds for a demurrer under FED.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In doing so, Judge Green was affirming the holding of Judge Friendly in
UT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975). 517 F. Supp. at 550.
173. 517 F. Supp. at 550.
174. Id at 548. Fiartiga held that jurisdiction under section 1350 existed under facts
similar to those in Hanoch Tel-Oren. See text accompanying notes 102-29 supra.
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tiga's holding. 175
The vague language of section 1350 makes definition of a cause of
action difficult. Jurisdiction over "torts in violation of the law of na-
tions" could be interpreted in at least two different ways. First, this
phrasing could mean that international law is relevant only for provid-
ing jurisdiction, while the underlying cause of action for a tort is gov-
erned by the substantive tort law of the situs. 176 While this approach to
the domestic application of international law under section 1350 can be
justified constitutionally as an instance of "protective jurisdiction,"177 it
strains the limits of article III jurisdiction to have a case allegedly "aris-
ing under" the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States in
which the substantive law of the situs defines the cause of action.
178
The other approach to section 1350 jurisdiction interprets the stat-
ute as requiring that the alleged violation of the law of nations itself be
a tort.179 Under this approach, courts apply international law as it has
been incorporated into federal common law. The constitutional ques-
tion then becomes whether Congress has the power to treat controver-
sies between aliens over torts in violation of international law as part of
federal law. As discussed above and at length in Filartiga, the law of
nations is part of federal law due to our common law heritage.' s0
While certain concerns for federalism may be raised in response to this
interpretation of section 1350, federal control over these matters seems
prudent,18 1 and is consistent with the doctrine of hostis humanis generis,
long a tradition in our legal heritage.'8 2
Judge Green's decision in Hanoch Tel Oren did not address these
issues. However, in concluding the opinion, Judge Green made the fol-
lowing, somewhat disturbing, statement:
When the framers crafted Article III and when the First Congress
175. The Filartiga court's assertion that the claim was "grounded upon" the law of na-
tions indicates that international law alone may create a federal right of action. Comment,
Torture as a Tort in Violation of International Law: Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 33 STANFORD L.
REV. 353, 357 (1981).
176. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 3, at 97 (citing REsTATEMENT (FIRST AND SaC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS). This approach was applied successfully in Abdul-Rahman
OmarAdra v. ClI1ft, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
177. See generally Mishkin, The Federal 'Question' in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L.
REv. 157, 184-96 (1953); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957) (Burton,
J. & Harlan, J. concurring).
178. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 3, at 98..
179. Id at 98-102.
180. See text accompanying notes 133-39 supra.
181. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 3, at 100-01.
182. See note 133 supra.
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considered jurisdictional grants to the federal courts, they did not
contemplate the use of the federal courts as a substitute for an inter-
national tribunal, adjudicating claims arising under international
law, when no private right of action was provided.
183
After making this broad pronouncement, Judge Green proceeded to
describe in a footnote' 14 an extreme example of how human rights law-
suits might become problematic. by unduly intruding into the domestic
affairs of sovereign nations.
It is regrettable that this sort of extreme example should be cited
because it clearly misses the carefully circumscribed analysis applied in
Filarfiga. The Second Circuit in Filartiga recognized that section 1350
had bein rendered a dead letter by restrictive judicial interpretations
ever since its passage by Congress in 1789. However, the Filariga court
also noted that this was due in large part to "the fact that earlier cases
did not involve such well-established, universally recognized norms of
international law" as that against torture.'85 The Second Circuit ap-
plied a very restrictive standard of what constitutes international law
and found that the prohibition against torture met that standard.
When an extreme example is cited in which either the alleged interna-
tional norm does not meet this high standard or the facts do not sup-
port the application of the norm, the focus is removed from the legal
concepts at issue.
Does Judge Green mean to suggest that individuals may not bring
suit against pirates or against slave-traders for violation of interna-
tional law? Does Judge Green reject the doctrine, firmly imbedded in
our legal heritage, of hostis humanis generis? Would Judge Green hold
that well-established, universally recognized norms prohibiting torture
and genocide have not evolved such that these two torts now fall within
the doctrine? Considering the detailed legal analysis provided by the
Second Circuit in Filartiga, as well as in the articles cited in the Hanoch
Tel-Oren opinion, these important issues deserve more serious consid-
eration. Presumably, as the Fiartiga court noted, these issues "will be
183. 517 F. Supp. at 551.
184. Id at n.5. In this footnote the court observed that:
[tihe possible presumptuousness of private human rights lawsuits is self-evident.
Imagine a suit brought in Mexico, for example, by the Black Panther Party'against
the visiting chief of police of Philadelphia, alleging violations of international con-
ventions prohibiting genocide and systematic racial discrimination. Certainly,
such an application of international law would meet stiff, and legitimate, opposi-
tion in the United States.
185. 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980).
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a subject for continuing refinement and elaboration"1 86 in subsequent
cases.
E. Summary: Are Domestic Courts Fertile Fora for the Application
of International Human Rights Law?
Domestic courts may be fertile fora for the application of interna-
tional human rights law, as demonstrated by the cases discussed above.
Creative legal theories and extensive evidentiary substantiation have
combined to produce some promising holdings in the last two years.
Nonetheless, in the march to develop international human rights law,
these cases do not step out too forcefully; they leave much undone.
Numerous fundamental tensions surrounding the incorporation of in-
ternational law into the domestic legal framework remain unresolved.
The obligations of the United States under the human rights provisions
of the U.N. Charter remain weak and unclear. While there are promis-
ing signs regarding the UDHR, its status is uncertain as well. Although
domestic courts make proud pronouncements regarding these instru-
ments and our international obligations, they fail to explicitly endorse
them as law.
Clearly, the time is ripe to do just that. It is essential that human
rights advocates take advantage of these encouraging signals and work
to further the evolution of human rights law. The cases discussed
above illustrate some potential areas for accomplishing this goal. The
following two sections of this Note focus on one of the central issues in
this area: the role played by human rights treaties in the domestic legal
structure, within the framework of self-executing treaty analysis.
III. SELF-EXECUTING TREATY ANALYSIS: ITS
ORIGINS AND APPLICATION TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
DOCUMENTS
The doctrine known as self-executing treaty analysis is one of the
most amorphous in all of American jurisprudence. In 1961, a Florida
district court noted: "[I]t is difficult to extract any clear principle for
judicial guidance from the cases discussing this subject."' 87 As recently
as 1979, the Fifth Circuit said in U.S. v. Postal, "the self-executing
186. Id at 885.
187. Aerovias Interamericanas de Panama, S.A. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 197 F.
Supp. 230, 245 (S.D. Fla. 1961).
[Vol 5
International Human Rights
question is perhaps one of the most confounding in treaty law." '
Unfortunately, this vague concept deals with one of the most fun-
damental constitutional relationships in our legal structure: the role of
treaties in the domestic legal framework. The manner with which the
United States handles its treaty obligations plays a significant role in
the development of international law; therefore, the role of treaties in
our legal framework deserves careful consideration.
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
treaties made under the authority of the United States are the supreme
law of the land." 9 This constitutional grant of authority to treaties is
neither vague nor limited. It was the direct result of a Constitutional
Convention specifically convened to give the federal government clear
and broad powers in foreign relations. 9' However, judicial practice
has circumscribed this broad constitutional grant through self-execut-
ing treaty analysis.
A. Self-Executing Analysis in Foster and Percheman: Illegitimate
Parents?
The seminal case in this area is Foster v. Neilson.191 At issue was
whether land located west of the Perdido River was included in the
Florida Purchase. The treaty provision, as well as the surrounding his-
tory and context of the treaty, supported conflicting interpretations.
Congressional attempts to interpret the treaty reached inconsistent
results.
Chief Justice Marshall, who wrote the opinion, found himself in
the minority regarding the meaning of the provision at issue. As a
compromise, he was able to encourage a majority of the Court to agree
with him that the question was political and that the Court should de-
fer to the lead of Congress.192 In an opinion which may have reflected
his predisposition against self-executing treaties, 93 Marshall wrote:
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legisla-
tive act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accom-
plished, especially so far as its operation is infraterritorial; but is
188. 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979).
189. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, para. 2.
190. Evans, Sef-Executing Treaties in the United States ofAmerica, 30 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L
L. 178, 179-81 (1953).
191. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
192. Wright, su.pra note 21, at 67.
193. Id at 65 n.12.
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carried into execution by the sovereign power of the respective par-
ties to the instrument.
In the United States a different principle is established. Our
Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, conse-
quently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an Act of
the Legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any
legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a
contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular
act the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial depart-
ment; and the Legislature must execute the contract before it can be-
come a rule for the court.194
Foremost in this reasoning is an awareness of the separation of
powers problem with its attendant "political question" attributes. 195
Congress already had attempted to interpret the treaty and the Court
was reluctant to add to the confusion. Because of the overriding sepa-
ration of powers aspects in Foster, it has been argued that the opinion
is of no value for interpreting the relation of a treaty provision concern-
ing individual rights to state legislation. 196
The questionable basis of the Foster holding becomes more appar-
ent in the other seminal case for self-executing analysis, United States v.
Percheman. 97 In this case, decided four years after Foster, Marshall
interpreted the same clause of the same treaty and found it to be self-
executing.
There are several notable distinctions between the Foster and
Percheman cases. Unlike Foster, the lands involved in Percheman
were clearly within the ceded territory. The Spanish text of the treaty,
not consulted in Foster, indicated a slightly different meaning for one
phrase in the treaty. 19s It has been argued that the two opinions are
compatible because the greater clarity of the treaty provision obviated a
separation of powers problem in the later case. 199 However, the mean-
ing gained through the Spanish translation lent no further insights as to
which branch of the government was responsible for giving effect to the
treaty."o Additionally, the congressional committees were still in oper-
194. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314.
195. Note, Self-Executing Treaties and Human Rights Provisions of the United Nations
Charter- .4 Separation of Powers Problem, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 773, 775 (1976).
196. Wright, supra note 21, at 68.
197. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
198. Id at 88. The phrase in Foster read, "[the land grants] shall be ratified and con-
firmed"; in Percheman, the Spanish text read "shall remain ratified and confirmed."
199. Note, supra note 195, at 776.
200. Wright, supra note 21, at 66 n.13.
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ation when Percheman was decided, and Marshall devoted a considera-
ble portion of the opinion to attempting to clarify their function in light
of the treaty."° In sum, these two progenitors of self-executing analysis
do not shed much light upon the issue.
In spite of the apparent problems with this analysis, the judiciary
has attempted to apply it for the last 150 years. One opinion often cited
for a clear presentation of the analysis is the Head Money Cases.20 2 In
this opinion, Justice Miller stated:
A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It de-
pends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the
honor of the governments which are parties to it. If these fail, its
infraction becomes the subject of international negotiations and rec-
lamations,.., which may in the end be enforced by actual war. It is
obvious that with all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and
can give no redress. But a treaty may also contain provisions which
confer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of the na-
tions residing in the territorial limits of the other, which partake of
the nature of municipal law, and which are capable of enforcement
as between private parties in the courts of the ountry.... The
Constitution of the United States places such provisions as these in
the same category as other laws of Congress. . . . A treaty, then, is a
law of the land as an act of Congress is, whenever its provisions pre-
scribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may
be determined. And when such rights are of a nature to be enforced
in a court of justice, that court resorts to the treaty for a rule of deci-
sion for the case before it as it would to a statute.20 3
Two points should be drawn from this passage: 1) had Marshall ap-
plied this interpretation in Foster, the treaty provision at issue there
would have been self-executing, 2° and 2) while the judiciary has no
role in treaty and war negotiations between nations, it has a constitu-
tional mandate to enforce all treaty provisions whenever they prescribe
a rule by which the rights of individuals may be determined. The re-
sult of such conflicting precedents as Foster, Percheman, and Head
Money is that the entire line of self-executing analysis is in a state of
confusion.
201. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 89-98.
202. 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
203. Id at 598.
204. Wright, supra note 21, at 65 n.12.
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B. Self-Executing Analysis and International Human Rights
Treaties
Several early cases cited the human rights provisions of the U.N.
Charter as supporting authority for their holdings.20 5 These cases were
decided at a time when the events that led to the creation of the United
Nations, and the renewed sense of world cooperation that the U.N. em-
bodied, were fresh in mind. The first case in which the self-executing
nature of the U.N. Charter was central to the holding of the opinion
was Sei Fujii v. California decided by one of the California courts of
appeal.20 6
1. Sei Fujii v. Calfornia
Sei Fujii concerned a challenge to the California Alien Land Law,
which clearly discriminated on the basis of race.z0 7 In finding the state
statute invalid, the court relied on the human rights provisions of the
United Nations Charter. The court noted that in accordance with arti-
cle VI of the United States Constitution, the Charter is the supreme law
of the land, and any state law to the contrary is invalid. The court
found that the Alien Land Law was in conflict with the Charter's "plain
language" and "unmistakeable purpose and intent. z2 0
The court of appeal also discussed the UDHR, concluding that the
Alien Land Law was contrary to the letter and spirit of the U.N. Char-
ter and to article 17 of the UDHR, and that state law must yield to the
treaty's superior authority.20 9
This holding caused a national furor.210 One of the most radical
205. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (concurring opinions of Justices Black &
Douglas, and Justices Murphy & Rutledge); Namba v. McCourt, 185 Or. 579, 204 P.2d 569
(1949).
206. 217 P.2d 481 (1950), rev'd 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
207. See note 27 supra.
208. 217 P.2d at 486.
209. Id at 488.
210. One reaction was an urgent telegram to the counsel for the State of California from
Judge Hudson, an outspoken opponent of granting self-executing status to human rights
provisions. The telegram read, in part:
Articles 55 and 56 and the other provisions of the Charter cited by the court
are in no sense self-executing, and they are not operative as a part of our local law.
Apart from legislation enacted by Congress the provisions of the Charter on
Human Rights cannot properly be said to have any effect on the Alien Land Law
of California. Even less defensible is the court's reliance on Article 17 of the Dec-
laration of Human Rights promulgated by the General Assembly of the United
Nations in 1948. That declaration does not have the force of a treaty, and its pre-
amble shows clearly that the declaration was not intended to have any binding
effect on the members of the organization. Even if Article 17 of the declaration
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reactions was a constitutional amendment proposed by Senator Bricker
requiring that treaties could "become effective as internal law in the
United States only through legislation valid in the absence of interna-
tional agreements."2"' This attempt at substantial alteration of the
treaty making power as established in the Constitution was nearly suc-
cessful in the Senate.212
The California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal.21 3
The Court found the Alien Land Law invalid, but based its holding
independently upon the fourteenth amendment. Citing Foster as au-
thority for its self-executing analysis, the Court looked to the intent of
the signatory parties as manifested by the language of the
instrument.214
The Court found that it was "clear" from looking solely to the
language of the U.N. Charter that none of its human rights provisions
were self-executing. 215 This "clear" finding stands in contrast to the
"unmistakable purpose and intent" observed by the appellate court.21 6
One of the reasons that the Court found the language of article 56"inad-
equate for self-execution was that the Court interpreted this article as
contemplating "future legislative action by the several nations . . . to
accomplish the declared objectives. ' 217 Nowhere does the Court con-
sider the UDHR, nor does it address the question of whether the
UDHR constitutes this future legislation, thereby giving fuller, more
specific meaning to the terms of the Charter.
One significant factor that may explain the ultimate result in Fujii,
is that it was decided before Brown v. Board of Education.218 Thus, the
provision in article 55(c) of the Charter requiring "equal rights. . . for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion," would
have been in direct conflict with a number of state laws that had not yet
were operative in American law, its terms are too general for the conclusion to be
drawn thavthe Alien Land Law of California is in conflict with it.
Refprinted in R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF
LAW AND POLICY 97 (1979).
211. Treaties andExecutive Agreements: Hearings on SJ. Res. 1 Before the Senate Judici-
ary Comnm, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1955). For a discussion of the Bricker Amendment
and its effect on subsequent U.S. policy towards ratifying human rights treaties, see Weiss-
brodt, supra note 152, at 38 n.45.
212. 100 CONG. REc. 2255, 2262 (1954).
213. 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
214. Id at 721, 242 P.2d at 620.
215. Id at 722, 242 P.2d at 620.
216. See text accompanying note 208 supra.
217. 38 Cal. 2d at 722, 242 P.2d at 621.
218. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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been struck down under the fourteenth amendment.219 It has been sug-
gested that if the Fujii case were to be decided today, the result would
be different.22 Because the California Supreme Court opinion was not
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, the question technically
remains open for the country as a whole.221
2. Post-Fujii Applications
Most of the subsequent cases that have considered whether the
human rights provisions of the Charter are self-executing have merely
cited Fujii, or have echoed the decision without providing any addi-
tional analysis.222 Typical of this line of shallow evaluation is the re-
cent case of Davis v. Immigration and Naturalization Service.3
In Davis, the plaintiff, who had earlier renounced his United
States citizenship, attempted to enter the United States on a "World
Service Authority" passport, not considered a valid entry document by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. He was taken into cus-
tody, deemed an excludable alien and was facing deportation when he
brought a habeas corpus action. He made certain arguments based on
domestic immigration laws, as well as alleging a violation of article
13(2) of the UDHR, which provides that "[e]veryone has the right to
leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." 4
The court's response to this argument is found in a footnote where
it states: "It is well established that the United Nations Charter does
not supersede United States law.. . . The petitioner's argument based
on Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights fails for
the same reason."" 5 In light of the status that the Filartiga and Fernan-
dez courts granted the UDHR, such an offhand dismissal of the argu-
ment seems less than thorough. Unfortunately, however, such shallow
219. Note, supra note 195, at 782.
220. See Schliter, The Domestic Status of the Human Rights Clauses of the United Na-
tions Charter, 61 CAL. L. REv. 110, 148 (1973); Note, Individual Enforcement of Obligations
Arising Under the United Nations Charter, supra note 16, at 201.
221. Finch, The Need to Restrain the Treaty-Making Power of the United States Within
Constitutional Limits, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 72 (1954).
222. See, e.g., Vlissidis v. Anadell, 262 F.2d 398, 400 (7th Cir. 1959); Camacho v. Rod-
gers, 199 F. Supp. 155, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Hitai v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,
343 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1965); Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 245
Iowa 147, 157-58, 60 N.W.2d 110, 116-17 (1953); Commonwealth v. Muskie, 507 F. Supp.
1035 (D.P.R. 1981).
223. 481 F. Supp. 1178 (D.D.C. 1979).
224. UDHR, supra note 1, art. 13(2).
225. 481 F. Supp. at 1183 n.7.
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analysis is not uncommon.2 26
3. The Pauling Line
There is a line of cases which indicates that human rights provi-
sions of the Charter should not be self-executing, and which uses the
same questionable self-executing analysis. Foremost among these is
the case of Pauling v. McElroy.227 In this case, plaintiffs sued to enjoin
United States nuclear testing on their island homes, alleging, inter alia,
a violation of international law and the United Nations Charter. The
court denied relief on all counts, stating in reference to the interna-
tional law and Charter arguments:
The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Trusteeship
Agreement for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and the in-
ternational law principle of freedom of the seas relied on by plaintiffs
are not self-executing and do not vest any of the plaintiffs with indi-
vidual legal rights which they may assert in this Court. The claimed
violations of such international obligations and principles may be as-
serted only by diplomatic negotiations between the sovereignties
concerned. 2 s
Even though the Pauling court failed to provide any other analysis or
authority to support this holding, it has been followed perfunctorily in
numerous subsequent cases. 29
It is not clear where the Pauling court, and those cases that have
followed it, draw authority for such self-executing analysis. It appears
to be based on the general notion that most treaties do not vest the
individual with sufficient legal character to enable him to invoke inter-
national law in domestic courts, and that such executory international
law can only be invoked by sovereign nations. Such a holding goes
against the provisions of article VI of the United States Constitution
which imposes an obligation on the judiciary to apply treaties as the
law of the land, and to vest individuals with international character
226. For example, a judge characterized a reference to international law as "junk and
gobbledygook" in Turner v. Ward (unpublished, N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977), citedin R. LILLICH &
F. NEwMAN, supra note 210, at 121.
227. 164 F. Supp. 390 (D.D.C. 1958).
228. Id at 393.
229. See, ag., Orlando v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. -1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), aJ'd, 443 F.2d 1039
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267
(2d Cir. 1974) (Anderson, J. concurring in result); United States ex rel Lujon v. Gengler,
510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied481 U.S. 1001 (1975); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d
24 (2d Cir. 1976); Commonwealth v. Muskie, 507 F. Supp. 1085 (D.P.R. 1981).
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whenever the treaty permits.23°
Nonetheless, the American judiciary has shown a proclivity for a
Pauling analysis. This view of international law and the role of treaties
not only does disservice to the United States Constitution, but is clearly
out of touch with contemporary legal theory as well. Modem interna-
tional law, especially international human rights treaties, firmly vest
individuals with international legal character.23 1 To the extent that the
Pauling version of self-executing analysis fails to comprehend this fun-
damental shift in the focus of international law, it is sorely in need of
re-evaluation and revision, and its application is ill-advised.
In the battle to establish the human rights provisions of the U.N.
Charter as self-executing, there have been victories of sorts. Some of
the earliest cases contained strong incantations of this nation's duty to
fulfill its pledges under the Charter.232 Unfortunately, these references
tended to be vague, leaving the exact legal status of the Charter un-
clear, but generally held it to be an important factor that should be
considered when assessing United States public policy.
233
A number of cases have found other articles of the Charter self-
executing. Curran v. City of New york2 3 4 held that article 104 was self-
executing, but specifically reserved the question of the status of article
105 (concerning privileges and immunities of the United Nations).
Similarly, the case of Keeney v. United States2 5 apparently held that
articles 100 and 105 established a testimonial privilege for United Na-
tions employees, although the holding was based on other evidentiary
grounds. Finally, the Second Circuit in United States v. Toscanino23
6
based its holding on the obligatory force of article 2, paragraph 4 of the
Charter, yet stopped short of terming it self-executing. 237
A case with great potential for holding the human rights provi-
230. See text accompanying notes 194 and 203 supra.
231. See note 3 supra, and Singh, Domestic Jurisdiction and the Law of the United Na-
tions 180-95 (1954) (doctoral dissertation reproduced on microfilm by University Micro-
films, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1977).
232. See, e.g., concurrences of Justices Black and Douglas, and Justices Murphy and
Rutledge in Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Namba v. McCourt, 185 Or. 579,204
P.2d 569 (1949); Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (Edgerton, J. dissenting),
rev'd 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
233. See, e.g., Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948) (Carter, J. concurring).
234. 191 Misc. 229, 77 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
235. 218 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
236. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
237. Id at 277-78. However, this holding was seriously limited, if not overruled, in the
subsequent case of United States ex rel Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), which
effectively adopted Judge Anderson's concurrence in Toscanino.
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sions of the Charter to be self-executing is the Ninth Circuit's opinion
in People of Sa#pan v. United States Dep't ofInterior. s In this case, the
citizens of Saipan challenged an abuse of power by the High Commis-
sioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, who approved and
executed a commercial lease of property that the citizenry wanted re-.
served for public park purposes. Plaintiffs alleged that the High Com-
missioner violated both the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), and the Trusteeship Agreement made pursuant to article 79 of
the United Nations Charter.
The Sa#pan court held that Trust Territory government was im-
mune from review under the Administrative Procedure Act, and by
analogy, under NEPA as well." 9 However, using a somewhat innova-
tive form of self-executing analysis, the Ninth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court and held that "the Trusteeship Agreement can be a source of
rights enforceable by an individual litigant in a domestic court of
law.,240
The court did not find that any of the Charter articles discussed
were, standing alone, self-executing; in fact, even though plaintiffs
urged such a holding, the Sa#pan court assumed that they were not.241
The court held that the general principles outlined in the Charter had
been covered in more detail in the specific trusteeship agreement and
that the "preponderance of features" of the trusteeship agreement indi-
cated its self-executing nature.242 Thus, while Sa#pan did not hold any
Charter provisions directly self-executing, it held that an agreement
made pursuant to Charter direction, and intended to detail and imple-
ment such direction, was self-executing. In many respects, these expli-
cative functions that the Trusteeship Agreement served in relation to
the Charter are identical to those served by the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.
The UDHR has had a mixed reception in the courts. As with the
Charter, the early cases were both promising and vague. In the 1948
case of Lincoln FederalLabor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,
Justice Frankfurter cited, in a footnote to his concurring opinion, arti-
cle 20(2) of the UDHR as supporting authority for the holding.243 The
238. 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974) cert. denied 420 U.S. 1003 (1974).
239. 502 F.2d at 94-96.
240. 502 F.2d at 97.
241. Id
242. Id
243. 335 U.S. 525, 549 n.5 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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1950 case of Wilson v. Hacker2" cited article 2 of the UDHR, which
prohibits discrimination based on sex, as "[i]ndicative of the spirit of
our times." The Filariga and Fernandez cases represent the farthest
steps forward to establish the legal authority of the UDHR. More im-
portantly, these cases, by failing to endorse any specific level of author-
ity for the UDHR, leave the door open for further development in this
area.
The legal authority of the Charter and the UDHR is an area of
law in which the United States Supreme Court has remained particu-
larly oblique. The Court has never directly addressed the question of
whether or not any provisions of the Charter are self-executing, al-
though on at least one occasion it had the opportunity to do so.? 5
IV. SELF-EXECUTING ANALYSIS AND THE HUMAN
RIGHTS PROVISIONS RECONSIDERED
A. The Present State of the Analysis
As discussed above, the concept of self-executing treaty analysis is
in a state of confusion. The constitutional mandate in article VI is clear
and strong.2" The seminal cases for the analysis are vague and con-
flicting. Foster seemed to hold that since the treaty at issue contained
terms of contract, separation of powers considerations indicated that
the legislature and not the judiciary must implement it.247 Percheman
found the same treaty self-executing when a different translation ex-
pressed a clearer intent of implementation, even though the separation
of powers considerations remained unchanged.248 Head Money re-em-
phasized the original constitutional mandate.249
The more modem cases that have applied the analysis to the U.N.
Charter have generally been both unfavorable and less than thorough.
Sei Fuji and its progeny have alleged that the intent of the parties to
the Charter, as manifested by its language, clearly shows it was not
meant to be self-executing. 250 This line of cases focuses on the intent of
the parties and the precision of language used to express that intent.
244. 200 Misc. 124, 101 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
245. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). In this case the Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the 1965 Voting Rights Act on 14th amendment grounds, thereby avoiding
the argument that the U.N. Charter required the United States to enact such legislation.
246. See text accompanying note 189 supra.
247. See text accompanying note 194 supra.
248. See text accompanying notes 197-201 supra.
249. See text accompanying note 203 supra.
250. See text accompanying notes 215-17 supra.
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This "intent" analysis is subject to widespread criticism."s Not only is
it a useless tool given the variety of domestic constitutional structures,
but it loses sight of the constitutional bases of the self-execution
doctrine.z 2
The Pauling line of cases suffers from a similar misconception of
self-executing treaty analysis. These cases, while providing little analy-
sis, assume that international law rarely, if ever, vests the individual
with legal character or rights assertable in domestic courts. 253 This
view of international law unduly reflects the statist conceptions of the
nineteenth century. It does injustice to both the strong constitutional
mandate in article VI and the commendable notion in our common law
heritage that treaties and the law of nations be treated as the law of the
land. 4 More importantly, the Pauling view is oblivious to the evolu-
tionary developments in international law recently recognized in
Filarilga.
Unfortunately, the Pauling approach is presently the law. Al-
though the lower courts have developed a number of varying and con-
flicting versions of self-executing analysis, it does not seem likely that
the Supreme Court will provide any major clarification in the near fu-
ture. The need for such clarification is enormous, for the present state
of the law not only undermines the rights of litigants in our courts, but
it weakens the United States' role in developing international law, and
impairs its ability to fulfill international obligations. Until such clarifi-
cation is made, human rights plaintiffs will be forced to continue to
grapple with the doctrine's judicially-created vagaries.
One significant factor has changed since these cases were decided,
however. Fiariga and Fernandez have granted the UDHR substantial
legal authority in domestic courts. The interrelation between the Char-
ter and the UDHR is considerable, and the greater legal status of the
latter can lend authority to the former. As the following discussion will
show, this development may be the helping hand with which human
rights advocates can finally push the Charter into self-executing treaty
status.
B. The Basic Criteria
The essence of self-executing treaty analysis is quite intangible..
251. See Schlilter, supra note 220, at 129.
252. Note, Individual Enforcement of Obligations Arising Under the United Nations Char-
ter, supra note 16, at 200-01.
253. See text accompanying notes 227-30 supra.
254. See text accompanying note 133 supra.
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Considering the serious need for revision of the doctrine, surprisingly
little work is being done on the subject. In the few works addressing
the subject, different authors have maintained that the analysis should
be guided by a variety of very different criteria. One author argued,
seemingly out of desperation, that the basic issue should be "whether
the treaty states a rule complete enough for the courts to follow in de-
termining the rights of the parties. ... 2 Others emphasize the pre-
liminary question of whether the treaty provision even involves legal
obligations, before considering whether the obligation is judicially
enforceable. 256
Despite the need for fresh insight in this area, the force of prece-
dent greatly diminishes the likelihood that courts will significantly re-
vise the doctrine. Legal arguments will undoubtedly have to address
the same criteria as Fujii, Pauling, and Sa#pan. These cases rely on
three types of considerations: 1) whether the language of the Charter
shows that it was intended to be self-executing; 2) whether the circum-
stances surrounding its creation evidence such an intent; and
3) whether additional contextual factors and policy considerations in-
dicate such a result. The role of the UDHR in each of these considera-
tions is instructive.
1. The Language of the U.N. Charter
In assessing the self-executing character of a treaty, the language
of the treaty is analyzed for two different purposes. First, it is consid-
ered in order to evaluate the basic intent behind the treaty; if the lan-
guage is ambiguous, circumstances outside the treaty instrument itself
may be considered in gauging intent. Second, the language of the
treaty is examined to determine if it is precise enough to enable a court
to apply it.
Normally, "[t]he courts are to interpret treaties liberally to effect
their purpose, recognizing that a non-implemented treaty which is held
to be not self-executing becomes an unfulfilled international agree-
ment." '257 The cases have not applied the normal liberal standard of
treaty interpretation to the Charter, and many scholars agree that if
such an interpretation were applied, the Charter would be seen to in-
volve, at a minimum, a pledge by each member to take action in coop-
255. Comment, Criteriafor Self-Executing Treaties, 68 U. ILL. L.F. 238, 247-48 (1968).
256. See Schachter, The Charter and the Constitutiorn The Human A'ghts Provisions in
American Law, 4 VAND. L: REv. 643, 646 (1951); Note, supra note 195, at 782.
257. Comment, supra note 255, at 240.
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eration with the Organization to protect human rights.258
Some authors25 9 have suggested that the most appropriate stan-
dard for interpreting the Charter is the Vienna Convention of the Law
of Treaties. 260 This Convention was adopted in 1969, entered into force
on January 10, 1980, and has been generally held to constitute binding
customary international law.26 1 Articles 31-33 of the Convention iden-
tify accepted rules of interpretation, which, when applied to the Char-
ter, suggest "that the obligatory nature of the human rights clauses is
today outside the realm of serious controversy.
' 262
One authority has stated that the Vienna Convention "probably
will have no more effect on the human rights clauses than so-called
rules of statutory interpretation have had on the U.S. Bill of Rights.1 263
The author recommends-that interpreters be governed instead by tfie
UDHR. Recourse to subsequent agreements such as the UDHR is
clearly approved by the Vienna Convention.26" While the interpretive
role of the UDHR has in the past been subject to debate,2 65 the argu-
ments in its favor have accumulated with time, and the holdings in
Filarliga and Fernandez add considerably more weight.
Numerous other factors indicate the interpretive role of the
UDHR. When the Charter was being prepared, there was much dis-
cussion of the fact that its human rights provisions did not contain very
definitive standards.266 Several states argued that this lack of interna-
tionally recognized standards relieved them of specific obligations
under the provisions.2 67 The California Supreme Court apparently
adopted this argument in Sei Fujii when it held the U.N. Charter to be
258. Wright, supra note 21, at 72-73; Schachter, supra note 256, at 652-53; L. GOODRICH,
E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 381 (3d ed. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as GoODicH]; V. VAN DyKE, supra note 1, at 105-12.
259. See Schlitlter, supra note 220, at 117; Note, supra note 195, at 783-84.
260. Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, openedfor signature May 23, 1969, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969), 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 679 (1969) (entered into force Jan.
10, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention].
261. See Note, supra note 195, at 783 n.60 (citing S. RosENNE, THE LAW OF TRE.TIES
(1970) and Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1970)). Even
prior to its formal ratification in 1980, the Convention was widely accepted and its prescrip-
tions were generally followed. W. LEvi, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CON-
CISE INTRODUCTION 218 (1979).
262. Schlitter, supra note 220, at 126.
263. Newman, Interpreting the Human Rights Clauses of the UN Charter, 5 HUMAN
RIGHTS J. 283, 283 (1972).
264. Vienna Convention, supra note 260, art. 31, para. 3(a).
265. Schltiter, supra note 220, at 144.
266. See Singh, supra note 231, at 184.
267. For example, South Africa made this argument. Id at 184-85.
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executory both because its terms were insufficiently definite and be-
cause it contemplated "future legislative action. 2 68 Thus, because the
UDHR is more definitive, it supplies precisely what the U.N. Charter
allegedly lacked.2 69 To use the UDHR in such an interpretive role
would not be a novel approach. A closely analogous precedent was set
in Saipan. In that case, a trusteeship agreement between the U.S. and
the United Nations made pursuant to article 79 of the Charter was held
to be sufficiently detailed to be self-executing.2
2. The Circumstances Surrounding the Creation of the Charter
As noted earlier, the events of the Second World War changed the
conscience of the international community. The protection of human
rights via numerous international treaties became a primary goal.
However, because nations were still largely unwilling to part with their
sovereignty, article 2(7) was made a principal provision of the U.N.
Charter.271 These two seemingly conflicting provisions-obligation to
protect human rights and freedom from interference with "domestic
jurisdiction"-have been the source of much misdirected debate ever
since.
Two arguments, however, have convinced numerous authorities
that article 2(7) is no obstacle to international consideration of a state's
human rights policies.272 First, article 2(7) forbids only United Nations
intervention, and does not address the question of obligations assumed
as individual states pledge to take separate action.2 73 Second, universal
practice by both states and international bodies show that human rights
are no longer solely within a state's domestic jurisdiction 74
Another line of argument claims that analysis of the Charter's cre-
ation shows that the human rights provisions were not intended to be
268. See text accompanying note 217 supra.
269. Singh, supra note 231, at 185.
270. See text accompanying note 242 supra.
271. Article 2(7) states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter, but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforce-
ment measures under Chapter VII.
272. See Note, Individual Enforcement of Ohligations Arising Under the United Nations
Charter, supra note 16, at 208; Wright, supra note 21, at 74 n.35; Schachter, supra note 256,
at 648; Schltiter, supra note 220, at 120; V. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 112-20.
273. Note, Individual Enforcement of Obligations Arising Under the United Nations Char-
ter, supra note 16, at 208.
274. Id See text accompanying note 3 supra.
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self-executing. One scholar has pointed out that the intent of the par-
ties may properly be considered only in assessing the substantive im-
port of the treaty's provisions, not in assessing the intended procedures
for domestic implementation. 5
The circumstances surrounding the Charter's creation reveal some
interesting facts about the intent of the parties. The Charter contains
what has proven to be a troublesome statement: "All members pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Or-
ganization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article
55.276 An analysis of the working papers of the San Francisco Confer-
ence reveals that this phraseology was a compromise reached after sev-
eral pievious drafts had been objected to.2 77
The Australian delegate originally proposed a clear threefold
pledge: "All Members pledge themselves to take separate and joint ac-
tion and to cooperate with the Organization and with each other to
achieve these purposes."27 However, the United States delegation,
concerned with intervention into domestic jurisdiction, expressed doubt
concerning the pledge to take separate action. It proposed simply a
pledge to cooperate. Several delegations, including the Australian, ob-
jected to this United States proposal, insisting on inclusion of a pledge
to take separate action. The matter was referred to a subcommittee and
the result was the present compromise: the pledge to take separate ac-
tion was qualified by the phrase "in cooperation with the
Organization."
Several significant points are evident in this history. First, the
drafters specifically rejected a text which merely provided for a pledge
to cooperate with the Organization because they wanted a "separate
action" pledge as well. Second, the concern over having a "separate
action" pledge was that it would allow for United Nations intervention
in domestic affairs.279 Lastly, although it was the intent of the United
States in particular to avoid a "separate action" pledge, the American
position was not adopted by the drafters.280 Thus, recourse to the cir-
cumstances surrounding the creation of the Charter, as evidenced in
275. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and US. v. Postak Win at Any
Pice?, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892, 896-97 (1980).
276. U.N. CHARTER, art. 56 (emphasis added).
277. See GOODRICH, supra note 258, at 380-81; Wright, supra note 21, at 72-73;
Schachter, su.pra note 256, at 649-50.
278. GOODRICH, supra note 258, at 380-81.
279. Schachter, supra note 256, at 650 n.38.
280. Wright, supra note 21, at 73 n.32.
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the working papers, shows that the final intent of the parties was to
require some form of "separate action."
3. Other Contextual Factors and Policy Considerations
It was previously noted that the Sa~ian court employed a some-
what innovative self-execution test. This test relied on examination of
four "contextual factors," including:
[1] the purposes of the treaty -and the objectives of its creators,
[2] the existence of domestic procedures and institutions appropriate
for direct implementation, [3] the availability and feasibility of alter-
native enforcement methods, and [4] the immediate and long-range
social consequences of self or non-self-execution. 81
This version of self-executing analysis has been hailed as "the
most widely accepted restatement of the doctrine," and "the definitive
modem statement of the doctrine."2 2 While it is true that this 1974
Ninth Circuit case has been cited for its self-executing analysis, 2 3 the
"definitive" status of this analysis does not necessarily follow. While
the Saipan self-executing test represents an admirable attempt at sorely
needed innovation, it, like its predecessors, is easily subject to abuse.
The first factor considered under the Sa~ian test is the purpose of
the treaty and objectives of its creators. It is not clear whether consid-
eration of such purpose and objectives would be limited to an evalua-
tion of the language of the Charter, or whether it would entail an
inherently problematic investigation into the deeper "intent" of the
parties. In any case, a strong argument can be made that the language
of the Charter standing alone is sufficiently obligatory and precise to be
self-executing.
The second Saipan factor is the existence of domestic procedures
and institutions appropriate for direct implementation. This is the one
Sa~pan criterion that appears to remain most true to the constitutional
separation of powers basis for the doctrine. If sufficient procedures and
institutions do not exist, some form of legislative action will likely be
necessary to provide them. This is not the case with the human rights
provisions of the Charter. Our domestic judicial system should be able
281. 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1974).
282. Note, Individual Enforcement of Obligations Arising Under the United Nations Char-
ter, supra note 16, at 196, 209.
283. See, e.g., Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Postal,
589 F.2d 862, 877 (5th Cir. 1979).
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to implement those provisions with little difficulty.28 4
The third Saipan factor is the availability and feasibility of alter-
native enforcement methods. This factor is related to the second factor,
and thus may correctly involve the same separation of powers consider-
ations. The existence of an alternative congressional enforcement
mechanism appeared to be a key factor in Justice Marshall's decision in
Foster.285 However, to the extent that this factor involves considera-
tions other than separation of powers, such as recognition of enforce-
ment mechanisms other than in one of the other branches of domestic
government, there appears to be little need for it in self-executing
analysis.
That this third factor is of questionable use was shown in the case
of Diggs v. Richardson.286 In Diggs, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals applied the Sai7an criteria to a challenge of the
United States' abrogation of a Security Council Resolution prohibiting
dealings with South Africa. The court found that the Resolution was.
"not addressed to the judicial branch of our government" and did not
"confer rights upon individual citizens," '287 even though the plaintiffs'
only other forum was the Security Council. Thus, this third factor,
rather than being properly based on self-executing analysis, merely
provides a new opportunity for courts to make policy considerations
not properly within their purview.
The fourth and final Saipan factor is the immediate and long-
range consequences of self or non-self-execution. It is here that Sai(pan
goes far astray from proper self-executing analysis. This broad factor
can only serve as a very subjective and arbitrary means for the judici-
ary to evaluate our nation's treaty obligations. Its use would usurp the
role assigned by the Constitution primarily to the executive and legisla-
tive branches, and would entirely undermine the separation of powers
basis for the self-executing doctrine. Perhaps the fact that the Saipan
court made no attempt to apply this fourth factor bespeaks its
uselessness.
284. Note, Individual Enforcement of Obligations Arising Under the United Nations Char-
ter, supra note 16, at 211.
285. See text accompanying notes 194-95 supra.
286. 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also discussion of this case in Note, Individual
Enforcement of Obligations Arising Under the United Nations Charter, supra note 16, at 210-
11.
287. 555 F.2d at 851.
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V. CONCLUSION
The prospects for the role of the United States government in the
development and promotion of international human rights law in the
near future do not appear bright. Yet, there remains a potentially pow-
erful means whereby United States human rights advocates can ad-
vance this cause. The two recent cases of Filartiga and Fernandez show
that international human rights law can be accepted as legal authority
in United States courts. Now is the time for human rights attorneys in
the United States to take advantage of these promising signs and push
forward for continued evolution in international human rights law.
A review of self-execution analysis shows that it is in disarray,
largely due to its unsound theoretical foundations. This analysis pres-
ently has many variations, most of which bear little relation to the orig-
inal constitutional underpinnings outlined by Justice Marshall. The
result is that the judiciary has severely circumscribed the international
stance mandated by the United States Constitution.
While revision of self-execution analysis is sorely needed, the vari-
ous precedents are at present too firmly ensconced to allow much room
for judicial creativity. Thus, human rights advocates will have to con-
tinue to base their arguments upon the various analyses currently in
vogue. The interpretive role of the UDHR, and the legal authority
granted it by Filartiga and Fernandez, may be the most crucial factors
in finally making the U.N. Charter self-executing.
In working to advance the status of international human rights
law, human rights advocates will, no doubt, keep several things in
mind. Regrettably, the pace of social development is glacial. When the
various historical, political, and economic factors, combined to produce
the radical new nation known as the United States of America, many
proud ideals were proclaimed to be the law of the land for the first time
in history. One of these ideals was embodied in article VI of the Con-
stitution, establishing treaties as part of the supreme law of the land.
Though much progress has been made, after 200 years our nation is
still struggling to make this a reality.
Similarly, the events that produced the United Nations inspired
many sweeping pronouncements dealing with international law, in-
cluding articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, and the UDHR. The
potential is now before us to achieve great things. We should en-
courage the United States to live up to its constitutional and interna-
tional commitments, and to work to further develop international
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human fights law. Surely, such an accomplishment would be of lasting
significance.

